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Introduction
Standard job search theory implies that longer entitlement periods for unemployment benefits increase the expected duration of unemployment spells until individuals accept a new job, because unemployment benefits act as a search subsidy (see Katz and Meyer, 1990, Meyer, 2002, for surveys) . Theory also suggests that the incidence of unemployment among those eligible for benefits should increase. Whether the quality of post unemployment jobs (job match) as measured by the level of earnings or the stability of employment should improve, depends on the specific assumptions regarding the model (Meyer, 2002) , e.g. regarding the endogeneity of search effort.
In a seminal paper for the US, Meyer (1990) uses institutional changes as a natural experiment to identify the empirical effect of unemployment insurance on unemployment duration. The study finds that an increase in the entitlement period results in a sizeable increase in unemployment durations. The main purpose of our paper is to reexamine these results using administrative data from Germany. As a contribution to the literature, our analysis takes into account that unemployment in an economic sense is not observed in administrative data. For this reason, we use two different proxies for unemployment, namely nonemployment and unemployment between jobs. Our empirical results strongly depend upon the definition of unemployment.
A number of institutional changes in the West German unemployment compensation system were enacted between 1985 and 1987. The most important changes were the extensions of the maximum entitlement periods for unemployment benefits in the case of older unemployed, while entitlement lengths for the younger unemployed were not changed. The analysis here analyzes the effects on unemployment durations due to this natural experiment. Although, these reforms were conducted during the 1980s, its analysis is still of high policy relevance as it can provide insights about possible effects of a reduction in benefit entitlement periods which were implemented by Starting with Hunt (1995) , a number of studies have analyzed empirically unemployment durations in West Germany before and after the reforms in the 1980's (see among others Hujer and Schneider, 1995; Steiner, 1997; Weber, 1999; Decressin, 2001; Plaßmann, 2002) . Most of 1 Hunt (1995) finds that the extensions in benefit entitlements resulted in a strong increase of unemployment durations of the older workers. Section 2 discusses that this finding is not undisputed in the literature. The conflicting evidence based on the GSOEP might be due to a number of important data problems, among others the small sample size and measurement error in the exact timing of unemployment. This is one of the motivations for our analysis based on the IAB employment subsample (IABS), a large administrative data set for Germany.
Previous studies have focused on self reported registered unemployment, when using the GSOEP, or benefit recipience, when using the IABS. Little attention has been paid to the fact that both proxies for unemployment differ from unemployment in an economic sense, defined as not being employed and actively looking for a job under the current market conditions. The IABS does not record unemployment in an economic sense. As an extension of the existing literature, our study investigates what can be learnt about unemployment based on two proxies constructed from the IABS. In addition to the analysis of unemployment duration, we analyze reform effects on the incidence of unemployment and the quality of the job after the end of unemployment. The latter issues have not been investigated in the previous literature for Germany (see Gangl, 2002, for an exception analyzing the quality of the job after unemployment).
We perform a descriptive empirical analysis based on the IABS, which contains panel data for about 500.000 individuals for West-Germany during the period . We make use of the richness of the data and, in contrast to the literature so far, we focus on non-parametric estimates thus reducing the risk of misspecifying the empirical model. Due to the lack of precise information on the length of unemployment duration, our analysis distinguishes between the duration of nonemployment versus the duration of unemployment between jobs as two benchmarks.
Our main results are as follows: The observed increase in inflows into unemployment among older individuals are likely due to a strong increase in early retirement. The median nonemployment duration for older unemployed (>53 years) almost doubled between 1981 and 1995 whereas the median nonemployment duration of younger unemployed (<42 years) remained constant. At the same time, the median duration of unemployment between jobs remained almost constant over the period for all age groups. In particular for exits from the manufacturing sector, the probability for staying in nonemployment has increased for older individuals to a striking level of about 90%. This is probably related to the sharp reduction in employment in this sector which was partly achieved by the use of early retirement packages. Surprisingly, we do not find evidence for changes in the distribution of unemployment between jobs durations. We observe that the 1 Only Weber (1999) and Plaßmann (2002) use the IAB employment subsample.
length of employment spells after a period of unemployment between jobs did not increase for the age groups with longer benefit entitlements in comparison. Moreover, the post-unemployment earnings for the unemployed aged 42 − 65 did not increase after the reform relative to the earnings of the aged <42. This indicates that the match quality between employee and job has not improved after the reforms. We conclude that a major part of the additional expenses by the German federal labor office yielded an advantage for mainly two groups: companies, who disband their older unemployed using subsidized early retirement packages and the older employees who lost the incentive to look for a new job using the extensive early retirement packages.
Since unemployment between jobs is an endogenous outcome conditioning on the exit state in a competing risk model which involves exits from unemployment to both employment and to out of labor force, more research on the determinants of these exits and on the determinants of inflows into unemployment is needed. Our descriptive evidence can not provide causal evidence as to why the distribution of unemployment between jobs duration did not change.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes the data and the institutions. Nonemployment and unemployment-between-jobs are defined in section 4 as two proxies for unemployment available in the data. Section 5 presents our main descriptive findings on the durations for the two proxies and the changes induced by the reforms. Section 6 provides complementary evidence on employment before and after unemployment. Section 7 summarizes and interprets the results and concludes. The appendix contains further institutional information and the detailed empirical findings.
Review of the Literature
Our review of the literature focuses on the effects of benefit entitlement periods because their extension was the main aspect of the reforms during the 1980's in Germany. Meyer (2002) and OECD (2003a) provide recent surveys on the effects of unemployment benefits on the duration of unemployment. Empirical studies for the US find significantly positive elasticities of duration with respect to the potential duration of benefits. Meyer (1990) uses institutional changes as a natural experiment to identify the effect of changes in unemployment insurance on unemployment duration in a hazard rate model. These institutional changes are not affected by differences in unobserved heterogeneity which might have plagued previous evidence. Meyer (1990) finds that an increase in the entitlement period by 1 week results in increase of unemployment duration by 0.1 to 0.2 weeks, which is a sizeable disincentive effect of benefit entitlement. This estimate implies an elasticity around 0.5, and the earlier literature even found larger elasticities (as surveyed in Meyer, 2002) . In contrast, the more recent literature tends to find much smaller elasticities for the US (e.g. 0.1. as in Card and Levine, 2000) . Narendranathan, Nickell and Stern (1995) find for Britain a positive elasticity of expected unemployment duration for men with respect to the level of unemployment benefits. The effect depends on the age and is smaller for the > 45 years old. They do not find an impact for the long term unemployed. Van den Berg (1990) obtains positive elasticities using data from the Netherlands in a non-stationary job search model. The elasticities are greater after two years of duration time. Recently, van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) provide quasi-experimental evidence for Slovenia that a reduction in benefit entitlement periods strongly increased job finding rates, whereas the quality of the post-unemployment jobs remained unaffected: the paper finds that the change had no effect on either the type of the contract (temporary vs. permanent), the duration of the postunemployment jobs, or the wage earned in this job.
For Germany, the study by Hunt (1995) is the first to analyze the strong institutional changes in benefit entitlement periods during the 1980's.
2
During that time, benefit entitlement periods were extended from 12 months up to 32 months by age groups (42-43, 44-48, 49-53, 54+) , where the extension was stronger for older workers (see table 1 ).
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The transition was stepwise over the years [1985] [1986] [1987] for the different age groups. Since the maximum entitlement periods for unemployment spells starting in 1984 or later was also extended ex post, it is expected to find smoother transitions in the data and not a single jump. The unemployment durations started in 1983 were the last to which only the old law applied.
Using the German Socioeconomic Panel for the years 1983-88, Hunt models exit from unemployment with a competing risks Cox model combined with a difference-in-differences approach.
The treatment group is the age group of unemployed who are possibly affected by the institutional changes, irrespective of whether the individual unemployed are eligible for benefits. Control variables are an individual's age group, the time period, the interaction of time and age (treatment groups), and various demographic variables. The control group consisted of unemployed individuals aged 41 or less. Identification comes from the differential effect of the policy changes on the treatment and control groups. The analysis finds some significant positive effects of potential duration of benefits in Germany on the actual duration of unemployment. For the 44-48 year old, the reforms mainly reduced exits to employment, whereas for the older age group 49-57 the benefit duration effect is much smaller and works only through an extension of the duration until exit to 2 Earlier studies for Germany, which had estimated the impact of benefit recipience on the duration of unemployment, could not distinguish well the benefit effect from unobserved heterogeneity, see Hunt (1995) . Benefit eligibility depends upon previous work experience, possibly resulting in a positive selection of benefit recipients.
3 For a detailed description of the German unemployment compensation system and of the conducted reforms, see Hunt (1995) and Plaßmann (2002) .
out of labor force. Also for the 49-57, the extension of the unemployment durations seems to have started before the reform took place. However, as mentioned in the introduction, aspects of the reforms were extended ex post to ongoing spells. The standard errors of the estimated effects of benefit durations are very high, which Hunt attributes to the small size of the various treatment groups when stratified by exit state. The estimated treatment effects are never jointly significant and no significant effect is found for the age group 42-43.
While Hunt (1995, pp. 110) mentions the possibility that some of the older workers in the age range 49-57 may participate in early retirement schemes on the way out of the labor force, this issue is not investigated further in her study. Based on Hunt's estimated competing risk model for the age group 49-57, which implies that the extension of benefit entitlements works only through extending the time until exit to out of labor force, the institutional reforms should have caused an observed increase in the share of exits of this group to employment and an extension of observed duration of unemployment among those who eventually show a transition to employment.
Anticipating our results, we show that these implications are not supported by our administrative data.
After the study by Hunt (1995) , a number of further studies have analyzed empirically unemployment durations in West Germany before and after the reforms under consideration (Hujer and Schneider, 1995; Steiner, 1997; Weber, 1999; Decressin, 2001; Plaßmann, 2002) . Most of these studies are based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and some studies confirm the negative disincentive effect on unemployment duration.
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Hujer and Schneider (1995) find that the age group 44-48 exhibits significantly smaller re-employment hazards compared to younger workers. Steiner (1997) and Plaßmann (2002) have similar findings for older unemployed. Steiner (2001) concludes that the results are in accordance with one of the main implications of job-search theory, i.e. unemployment durations increase when entitlement periods are extended.
Using a longer and larger data set from the GSOEP and pooling data from West Germany for 1984 to 1996 with data from East Germany for 1992 to 1996, Decressin (2001) reanalyzes the same institutional changes in the 1980's as Hunt (1995).
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As a major difference to Hunt (1995) , this study only assigns individuals to the treatment group who actually are eligible to unemployment benefits because only for this group the institutional effects do apply. One would expect this to sharpen the estimated disincentive effects. However, as the main result, Decressin (2001) concludes that there is no systematic relation between the institutional changes in the 1980's and 4 Only Weber (1999) and Plaßmann (2002) use earlier versions of the IAB employment subsample. Both studies do not explicitly address the problem that unemployment in an economic sense can not be identified in this data set, see our discussion in section 3. 5 Decressin (2001) also analyzes reductions of benefits in 1994.
the exit rates from unemployment, thus implying that the length of entitlement periods has no effect on the duration of unemployment. In contrast to earlier studies and in line with the international evidence (Meyer, 2002) , Decressin (2001) finds a strong negative relation between the amount of unemployment benefits and the hazard rate from unemployment. Similar to Decressin (2001) , Schneider and Hujer (1997) using GSOEP data and Weber (1999) using the IAB employment subsample do not find effects of the institutional changes in the 1980's on the duration of unemployment until a new job is found.
The conflicting evidence based on the GSOEP might be due to the following data problems.
First, there is strong evidence for heaping effects in the survey such that a disproportionately large number of unemployment spells is reported to end in December. This is due to the fact that the interview each year involves asking retrospectively for the monthly employment status during the last year. Then, this monthly employment calendar is put together on a year-by-year basis and unemployment spells ending early in a year seem to be underreported in that year. Researchers often take account of this problem by adding a December dummy in their analysis (e.g. Hunt, 1995) , but it is not clear whether this is sufficient. Second, recent evidence shows a strong recollection error for the retrospecitive employment calendar in the GSOEP (Jürges, 2005) . Third, the GSOEP involves a large number of missings regarding unemployment benefits. Fourth, unemployment in the GSOEP is measured as registered unemployment ('arbeitslos gemeldet'). Thus, it
is not clear whether individuals are unemployed in an economic sense, i.e. actively searching for a job. This distinction becomes very important regarding incentives for early retirement by elderly workers. Finally, the sample size of the GSOEP is too small for a detailed competing risks model by age groups and year, a complaint raised also by Hunt (1995) .
Changes in benefit entitlement periods potentially affect other labor market outcomes in addition to prolonging the duration of unemployment (Meyer, 2002) . Two noteworthy aspects are the quality of the job match after having found a job and the incidence of unemployment (inflows). In a search model, an extension of the benefit entitlement period increases the reservation wage and reduces the search effort. The first effect should result in a better job match (e.g. higher wage), once employment is found. The reduction in search effort works in the opposite direction. In a recent study for Germany, Gangl (2002) finds positive effects of longer entitlement periods for unemployment benefits on the quality of subsequent jobs regarding the wage level and the stability of employment. Since the extension of benefit entitlements makes unemployment more attractive, the incidence of unemployment should increase among individuals who are eligible for the longer benefits (Meyer, 2002) . This second effect has not been analyzed explicitly for Germany and will addressed in our empirical analysis.
The recent study OECD (2003a) emphasizes that changes in incentives induced by unemploy-ment benefits take a while until they show their full impact. A major reason is that changes in incentives often involve an adjustment of lifestyle and a corresponding change in the inflows into unemployment. Thus, the full impact of institutional changes on the incidence of unemployment and the duration of unemployment can only be observed some years after the changes occurred.
Furthermore, OECD (2003a) emphasizes that benefit recipience can keep unemployed attached to the labor market, especially when combined with activation strategies. Thus, longer benefit entitlement periods could potentially cause individuals to postpone exits to out of labor force.
However,
In a recent paper, Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007) 6 analyze the effects of exhaustion of the benefit entitlement period on both exits from unemployment to employment and on exits from registered unemployment based on Austrian administrative data. Similar in spirit to the results of our paper, all exits from registered unemployment show a much larger spike at exhaustion of the benefit entitlement period compared to exits from registered unemployment to employment.
The author conclude that the spike in the former measure may overstate the disincentive effect of unemployment benefits.
Data and Institutions
The empirical analysis uses the IAB Employment Subsample (IAB-Beschäftigtenstichprobe 1975 -1997 [Regionalfile], IABS). A basic description of this data set can be found in Bender et al. (2000) .
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To sharpen our understanding of the data generating process, we decided not to rely on written information only. One of the authors visited several unemployment offices in different parts of West Germany to explore in more detail the reliability of the information recorded and how specific data problems can be explained. The data contain daily register data of about 500.000 individuals in West-Germany on their employment spells and the spells during which they receive transfer payments from the labor offices. It is a representative sample of employment subject to social security taxation and, therefore, it is not representative with respect to other labor market states. Employment periods are based on the register records of the public pension funds which obtain from the companies the relevant information about employment spells subject to social security taxation. Periods of employment as life-time civil servants (Beamte) or self employment are not included in the data.
Periods of registered unemployment -or economically more meaningful concepts of unemployment (e.g. according to the ILO standard) -can not be identified from the data. The German 6 We did not know this paper when we submitted the first version of our paper. 7 These data are also used by Weber (1999) , Plaßmann (2002) to analyze the duration of unemployment.
federal labor office has added instead periods of certain income transfer payments. The data record spells involving the following three types of transfer payments:
1. Unemployment benefits UB ("Arbeitslosengeld"), 2. Unemployment assistance UA ("Arbeitslosenhilfe"), and 3. Income Maintenance during training IMT ("Unterhaltsgeld"). This is paid during participation in public sponsored training as a part of active labor market policy.
Our discussion of institutions refers to the setup between 1981 and 1997 which differs from the situation today.
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The analysis in this paper is restricted to the years 1981 to 1997 because the information about spells with transfer payments is likely to be incomplete before that time, see Bender et al. (2000) and the references given there.
The three types of transfer payments differ with respect to the income replacement ratio and as to whether they are means tested. UB as well as IMT are paid as certain percentage (between 60 and 67%) of past earnings and they are generally not means tested. UA involves a somewhat lower replacement ratio (between 53 and 58% in the period of consideration) and it is means tested.
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Provided that individuals had sufficiently long employment spells before they become unemployed they are eligible for UB for the maximum entitlement periods depicted in table 1.
After the end of the maximum entitlement periods, they would become eligible for the lower UA only if their family had at most a negligible other source of income, i.e. UA is means tested. Until 1997 also participation in training did not only provide a source of income through receipt of IMT but it itself did also renew the entitlement for UB -just as if the unemployed individual had been working.
Unfortunately, the data only involve spell information on the fact whether transfer payments were received but do not provide the information on the level of these payments nor on the entitlement length. Evidence reported in Franz (2006, table 7.10) suggests that the actual replacement ratios are typically lower than the nominal ratios mentioned above. This is mostly due to temporary (6-12 weeks) or permanent sanctions ("Sperrzeiten") which are mainly applied for two reasons. First, when an unemployed worker quits voluntarily, he becomes eligible for UB only after a while. Second, when an unemployed worker rejects an acceptable job offer, he is punished 8 Also during the time period under consideration a number of changes were enacted in addition to the extension of the benefit entitlement periods. For instance, the income replacement ratios for UB and UA were reduced in the case of unemployed individuals without children and increased in the case of unemployed individuals with children, see Hunt (1995) . The income replacement ratio for IMT was above the ratio for UB at the beginning. It was reduced a number of times so that for most of the time period under consideration it was equal to the ratio for UB. 9 See Decressin (2001) for a detailed analysis of the changes in the replacement ratios.
by losing UB for a while. The IABS reports these periods of no UB receipt as a late start or as interruption in the spells of transfer payments. Wilke (2004) provides a descriptive analysis of sanctions in the IAB-Employment subsample.
In order to reduce the labor supply and "free jobs for young workers", government policy allowed receipt of UB as an intermediate step between employment and early retirement. While being on UB, social security taxes were still paid for unemployed individuals and they were still accumulating claims on social security payments after retirement. In addition, the discount on social security payments after early retirement, i.e. before the official retirement age at 65 years, was actuarially biased in favor of early retirement (see table 1 in Berkel and Börsch-Supan, 2003) . Thus, during the mid 1980s receipt of UB was becoming the stepping stone towards early retirement for workers at an age above 55 years (see Koller et al., 2003 , for a recent account of this).
The data provide no information on spells when an individual is registered as unemployed and is not entitled to transfer payments from the labor offices as well as whether she receives welfare payments ("Sozialhilfe"). This is particularly relevant for an analysis of long-term unemployment which in cases without transfer payments in the data can not be reasonably distinguished from having left the labor force.
Proxies for Unemployment
Since the data do not allow for an exact economically meaningful assessment as to whether an individual is unemployed or out of labor force, we use the two variables nonemployment and unemployment-between-jobs as benchmarks to analyze the changes in the duration of unemployment which are operationalized as follows:
1. Nonemployment (NE): all periods of nonemployment after an employment period which contain at least one period with UB, UA, or IMT transfer payemnts by the German federal labor office.
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The nonemployment period is considered as censored if the last record involves a transfer payment that is not followed by an employment spell.
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In this case, we do not know whether the individual is still unemployed, out of labor force, or even self-employed after the end of the last observed transfer payment spell. The spell is not censored if we 10 Spells where the employment spell in the respective year defining the inflow sample into nonemployment ends without a beginning spells with transfer payment are not considered here because these spells most likely represent out of labor force spells. Such spells are not affected by the reforms of unemployment compensation. 11 A nonemployment spell is treated as right censored at the end of the last observed transfer spell if it is not fully observed, i.e. if we do not observe a transition to employment before the end of the observation period. These two definitions provide benchmarks on the length of unemployment taking account of the fact that not all unemployed are successful in finding a new job during the period of observation (therefore the UBJ definition can not be used alone) and of the fact that unemployed individuals may leave the labor force. We assume that the distribution of actual unemployment (AU) in an economically meaningful concept lies between the length of unemployment between jobs and the length of nonemployment. In the case when people eventually leave the labor force, nonemployment in a strict sense is only known to be right censored at the end of the observation period.
We assume that censoring times are independent. In order to obtain a tighter bound for actual unemployment in this case, the NE definition assumes that actual unemployment ends at some unknown point of time after the exhaustion of transfer payment and it is quite likely that the end of actual unemployment lies before the end of the observation period. Therefore, in this case, the only information used in the NE definition is that unemployment is right censored at the end of transfer payments. Of course, NE being an upper bound, it accounts for the possibility that individuals might have left the labor force before the end of transfer payments, e.g. because they
are not interested in a new job any more, and they just keep receiving the transfer payments while the labor offices can not sanction this behavior.
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The NE definition also contains time gaps for individuals who may have left the labor force for some period.
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It is also important to mention that we only include spells with at least one day of receipt of unemployment compensation 12 See Wilke (2004) for an analysis of sanctions for unemployed. This study suggests that sanctions to a large extent seem ineffective due to a high withdrawal rate.
13 Using a more informative data source which is not available to researchers outside of the BA, Stefan Bender kindly provided us information about the status of individuals with unobserved periods before they start a new employment spell. He found that almost 80% of these periods correspond to other transfer payments.
as unemployment without any receipt of unemployment compensation can be hardly analyzed with present data and it was not affected by the reforms under consideration. In contrast, the UBJ definition excludes cases where a job is found some time after the end of the entitlement to transfer payments as these unobserved periods may correspond to a transition to out of the labor force. This allows us to focus on the link between benefit entitlement periods and the observed distribution of finding a job. A similar approach is also used by Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007) .
In an earlier discussion paper version of this paper (Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2004 , section 5), we provide a theoretical model that analyzes the link between the length of unemployment, NE, and UBJ in a competing risk model which involves exits from unemployment to both employment and to out of labor force.
We can not base our analysis on the concept of "registered unemployment", which is commonly used often in the public debate on unemployment, since there is not sufficient information in the data to identify this. Analogous to the argument above, it is reasonable to assume that the distribution of the length of registered unemployment spells lies between the length of unemployment between jobs and the length of nonemployment (in the sense of first order stochastic dominance). The results of our empirical analysis therefore applies just as well to registered unemployment.
14 However, in an economic sense, registered unemployment differs from our notion of actual unemployment.
Evidence on Unemployment Durations
This section presents the main descriptive empirical findings of the paper. We investigate the durations of nonemployment and unemployment between jobs for different age groups 15 and different years. First, we present some raw evidence based on histograms and median lengths for the observed, possibly censored durations as well as trends over time in the incidence of unemployment.
Next, we provide Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival functions taking account of censoring in the observed durations. Then, we interpret our findings. Our analysis tries to capture the long-term effects of the reform and, therefore, it is not restricted to the immediate post reform years (see OECD, 2003a , and the discussion at the end of section 2).
Raw Evidence
For the unemployment spells starting at the begin of the considered period (1981) and at the end of the available data (1994), the histograms in figure 1 old unemployed almost doubled over this period whereas it remained basically constant for the aged < 42. For the other age groups, the median NE duration remained constant during the 1980s and increased after the German reunification in the 1990s. This is most likely due to macroeconomic changes. Considering the median UBJ durations, one observes the same variation due to the business cycle but, at the same time, the older unemployed (> 53 years) leave unemployment faster than all other age groups. This property does not change over time and is therefore not affected by the reforms under consideration. Note that figures for the years after 1995 are not reported due to the censoring of the data at the end of 1997. Table 2 reports the observed number (incidence) of unemployment spells for the different age groups. Most noticeable is the sharp increase of the NE spells for the age group > 53 years, i.e. the inflows into NE spells, but not into UBJ, spells increased strongly over time. This finding corresponds to our evidence on transitions from employment to unemployment in section 6.1.
Kaplan-Meier Estimates
This section presents estimates of survival functions, which report the probability of remaining in NE and in UBJ, respectively, after a given duration. The Kaplan-Meier-estimator takes account of the inherent censoring for NE durations. An upward movement (increase) of the survival functions 16 The temporary decline in 1985 can be rationalized by the anticipation of the introduction of a more generous early retirement policy in 1986. Since 1986, there exists the possibility for older unemployed (currently aged 59 or above) to receive unemployment benefits -irrespective of their entitlement based on their employment history -if they commit not to search for a new job.
means that the probability of leaving unemployment has decreased.
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The following figures present selected representative survival function estimates for the 1980s and 1990s (until 1995) for the age groups considered.
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Figure 3 (left, upper panel) shows that the NE survival function did not change much for the aged < 42. The estimated survival curves are higher for bad years (1981, 1994 : bad in the sense of the labor market conditions) and lower for good (see above) years (1985, 1990) . For the age groups 42-43 and 44-48, we observe similar changes apart from that survival functions increase in the labor market slowdown of the mid 1990s (figure 3, left, middle and bottom). For the age group 49-53, the increase in the mid 1990s is sharper ( figure 4 , left, up). Considering the age group > 53, it is apparent that the NE survival functions increased continuously over the 15 years under consideration and they did so even in the boom year after the reunification ( figure 4, left, bottom) . Interestingly, at the same time, the UBJ survival curves of the older (> 53 years) remained almost constant(!) (figure 4, right, bottom). We observe similar patterns for the other age groups and the survival curves in the mid 1990s increased a bit for all groups including even the younger unemployed. It is not evident from these results that the increase is due to the reform between 1985-1987. It seems to be caused by a structural change due to the unfavorable macroeconomic environment. Since the increase of the UBJ survival functions is a bit greater for those aged 42-53 than for the young unemployed it might be the case that the reform shows an effect in a weak macroeconomic situation only.
Surprisingly, we do not observe this for the aged > 53.
Our discussion of the differential shifts in the estimated survival function is confirmed by the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates∆ t,t 0 =Ŝ t −Ŝ t 0 − (Ŝ and not reported here; they are available upon request) show a strong upward movement of the NE survival functions for the older, we do not observe such evidence for UBJ (if any, the positive effects we see, are considerably smaller for UBJ). Figure 6 shows that the survival curves vary sharply over the sector of last employment before 17 A detailed Kaplan-Meier unemployment survival analysis of the West-German 26-41 aged workforce can be found in Wilke (2005) . 18 Due to the large sample sizes the corresponding confidence bands are narrow. We did not add them because this would affect the readability of the graphs while the gain of information would be rather limited for our following reasonings.
entering unemployment. For the manufacturing sectors
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, the survival curves for the age group > 53 increased up to more than 0.9 after three years (figure 6, up, left), while this probability is only about 0.6 for the other sectors 20 (figure 6, bottom, left). The sharp increase of the survival functions, in particular in the manufacturing sector, is probably directly related to the massive early retirement programs which were conducted at this time. Considering the survival functions of those in UBJ (figure 6, right), the survival curves remained almost constant over time with some increase in the manufacturing sector in the mid 1990s.
Considering the empirical survival functions for the age group > 53 years in figure 7 , the effect of the reform on the observed length of NE becomes immediately apparent. The jumps at the maximum length of UB entitlements are shifted to the right after the reform. This shift is particularly obvious for the manufacturing sectors,
21
where the empirical survival function is shifted about 20 months to the right. The jumps for NE (being absent for UBJ) reflect that many observed spells end at the maximum entitlement periods and are thus due to the administrative rules. It follows that many older nonemployed then drop out of the labor force or they are not eligible for further unemployment benefits. Figure 4 (right, bottom) shows already that most of them did not re-enter into regular employment.
Summary
Our findings can be summarized as follows. There is no evidence for the reforms increasing UBJ durations to a sizeable extent. Instead, the reforms result in longer NE spells which are associated with higher exits to out of labor force of the elderly, most likely related to the strong increase in early retirement. In fact, it might be that the possibility of early retirement caused a reduction in unemployment duration in an economic sense even though the duration of benefit recipience increased. This argument is rationalized by the stylized model developed in an earlier discussion paper version of this paper (Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2004, section 5) . Although this interpretation is plausible, we can not interpret changes in the UBJ distribution in a causal way without imposing further assumptions. Moreover, it might be that many unemployed with UBJ duration did not have extended entitlement lengths as their previous employment periods are too short. For this reason the invariance of the UBJ distribution has to be considered as a stylized fact.
We can postulate three further implications of our interpretation of the results, which follow months. This pattern is clearly visible in figure 7 (left).
our observation that no sizeable changes of the UBJ distribution took place. First, the incidence of inflows into UBJ should not increase while second the incidence of inflows into NE should increase strongly. Third, the quality of jobs found after an UBJ spell should not have increased. These issues are investigated further in the next section.
Employment before and after Unemployment
This section adds evidence to the two further potential effects of an extension of benefit entitlement periods as discussed above, namely, on the incidence of unemployment and the quality of the post unemployment jobs. Also, one might be concerned that our descriptive findings in section 5 are affected by selection or composition effects. For instance, the group of older unemployed who end up finding a job might have become more selective in response to the reforms. The latter should show up in a higher quality of employment before and after unemployment, e.g. in higher employment stability or in higher wages. Furthermore, one might expect that the quality of employment after unemployment increases because longer entitlement periods reduce search costs. To gauge the validity of our interpretation of the descriptive findings in section 5, this section provides complementary descriptive evidence on the changes in employment before and after unemployment.
Transitions from Employment to Unemployment
Older workers in West-Germany enjoy substantial employment protection in the period under investigation which is codified in the German law for dismissal protection. In practice, it is very difficult to lay off older employees with long elapsed employment duration.
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The risk of unemployment for this group of individuals should therefore be quite low. It is also important to mention that since 1986 there exists the possibility for older unemployed (currently aged 59 or above) to receive unemployment benefits -irrespective of their entitlement based on their employment history -if they commit not to search for a new job. Older unemployed therefore have the option to receive unemployment benefits until they are entitled for transfers from the pensions system and during this period they are not counted as unemployed in the official statistics. Figure 8 presents the exit rates from employment to unemployment by age for 40 to 62 year old employees based on the two definitions of unemployment in selected years with rather different macroeconomic conditions.
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It becomes apparent that the risk of UBJ is almost independent of the age of the unemployed and of the year, whereas the risk of NE varies sharply. First, the risk of NE shows a peak between age 55 and 59. In 1981, the peak is only evident for age 59. In 1985 and 1990 the size of the peak declines but the dispersion increases and it shifts to the left.
The shift to the left and the increased dispersion are due to the extension of the unemployment insurance payment. This is because even workers who loose their job at age 55 after the reform are able to reach the critical age limit 59 without interruption of unemployment benefits transfers.
In 1995, the size of the peak increases sharply. This is a likely effect of the severe recession in 1993/94. Moreover, the employees aged 55-60 exhibit uniformly higher risks of NE. The risk of NE is particularly high in the manufacturing sector and even in the public sector the risk of nonemployment increases in the 1990s (see figure 9) . In table 3, we calculate the length of previous employment for employees who enter NE or UBJ. It is evident that, in particular, older employees with exits to NE exhibit very long previous employment spells. Over time, the length of previous employment increases and again the increase is strongest for the older. In manufacturing, this occurs for all groups in the age range 44 and above while in the public sector we see this only for the group >53. At the same time we do not observe this for employees entering UBJ. Moreover it is important to mention that the median length of pre-unemployment employment is between 10-12 months in the UBJ sample. This suggests that many of the unemployed with successful exit to employment do not have long unemployment benefit entitlement periods. This provides some evidence for why we should expect only moderate reform effects for the total group of older unemployed still looking for jobs.
The different results for the two definitions of unemployment suggest that under bad economic circumstances unemployment benefits are used specifically as an integral part in early retirement packages. Due to the reform of the maximum entitlement period, the peak of the NE risk shifted to the left, i.e. the early retirement is offered to the employees several years earlier.
Employment Stability and Wages after Unemployment
Employment after unemployment could be affected by the policy change and by changes in the composition of UBJ transitions over time. This can be assessed by analyzing the length of the following employment spells (employment stability) and the changes in earnings after unemployment compared to before unemployment. Also, search theory (assuming exogenous search effort)
would suggest that the match quality of employment after unemployment increases, resulting for 23 See Wilke (2005) for a more detailed analysis of the impact of changing macro conditions on the risk of unemployment for the 26-41 aged workforce.
instance in higher employment stability or in a higher wage, when longer entitlement periods for unemployment benefits reduce search costs. Figure 
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The increase of the maximum entitlement period is not associated with a shift of the distributions for the treated individuals to the right. Most likely, the changes in the distributions are mainly due to the business cycle. Surprisingly, between 50 − 60% of the considered group of unemployed improve their position in the wage distribution after unemployment compared to before.
26 Summarizing, at a descriptive level, there is no evidence among older unemployed for a higher quality of the job after unemployment regarding employment stability or higher wages. A possible explanation for this is that the quality of search has not changed and, at the same time, we do not find evidence that the group of older workers with UBJ transitions has become a more positive selection over time. We take this as complementary evidence supporting our interpretation of the descriptive findings in section 5. Our evidence differs from Gangl (2002) but is consistent with 24 The median is chosen because many long employment spells are censored at the data end of 1997. This affects in particular the average values in the 1990ties. 25 Nonparametric density estimates of the distributions are also time invariant over 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1994. 26 We also performed a mean regression analysis with wage after unemployment as dependent and maximum entitlement lengths among many other variables as regressors. Results also do not point to systematic effects of the entitlement lengths on wages. They are available upon request from the authors.
the recent findings of van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) .
Interpretation and Conclusions
This paper provides a descriptive analysis of the duration of nonemployment (NE) and unemployment between jobs (UBJ) in West Germany. We investigate the effects of the extensions in the maximum entitlement period for unemployment benefits for older workers during the mid 1980s.
To investigate further our interpretation of the main empirical results and to analyze whether selection or composition effects are important, our empirical analysis provides complementary descriptive evidence on employment before and after unemployment.
Our main empirical result is that the duration of NE for older unemployed increased sharply after the reform under consideration whereas the duration of UBJ did not change. This is because unemployment benefits were more frequently used as an integral part of early retirement packages and earlier retirement took place due to the extended entitlement lengths. With the reform, private firms -and also the public sector -obtained a convenient instrument to disband earlier older employees with the help of social compensation plans. Since the older employees did approve of such generous retirement packages, they did not insist on their dismissal protection. This potential win-win situation at the expense of the unemployment insurance is even observed in the public sector. The increase in the usage of early retirement is also strongly suggested both by the increase in the inflows of older workers into NE, especially in the economic recession after the reform, compared to the fact that inflows of older workers into UBJ did not increase after the reform. Our results imply that it is indispensable to distinguish between the flows out of labor force and the flows back into employment among the older (>53 years) unemployed, a point already emphasized by Hunt (1995) . Our analysis would therefore benefit from more comprehensive data which contains information about inflows to retirement. Our descriptive analysis is also not able to account for changes due to the business cycle or for indirect effects due to other reforms during the observation period.
The striking aspect of our descriptive results is that the distribution of UBJ durations for older workers evidently did not shift to the right. Clearly, our descriptive evidence on UBJ durations is based on an endogenous outcome conditioning on one exit state in a competing risk model involving exits from unemployment to both employment and to out of labor force. Ceteris paribus (no change in the transition to out-of-labor force via early retirement), one would expect a movement of the UBJ distribution to the right in response to an increase in benefit entitlement periods. Search theory would predict such a movement. By definition, longer entitlement periods also imply a truncation of UBJ after a longer duration of unemployment which would also result in a movement to the right. Thus, if anything, the endogenous nature of the UBJ definition should bias the results against our findings.
Our findings are consistent with simulations based on a simple competing risks model with unobserved heterogeneity as spelled out in an earlier discussion paper version of this paper (Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2004, section 5) . The model involves exits from unemployment to both employment and to out of labor force and it allows to analyze the link between the length of unemployment, NE, and UBJ. Based on the model, we simulate a policy reform which both decreases the transition rate from unemployment to employment and increases the transition rate from unemployment to out of labor force. As a result of such a reform the UBJ may even move to the left because of the much more frequent moves out of labor force.
Based on the considerations above, we think that our interpretation of the results is likely to be correct. There are two additional plausible explanations for our findings which may complement our interpretation: first, many older unemployed with exits to employment do not have long entitlement lengths for unemployment benefits. Second, a considerable share of older unemployed with extended entitlement periods for unemployment benefits did not change job search behavior after the reform. We can not assess these explanations based on our analysis.
Admittedly, more research is necessary on the determinants of UBJ and NE and the differences between the two. This is confirmed in a recent paper by Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007) who analyze the effects of exhaustion of the benefit entitlement period on both exits from unemployment to employment and on exits from registered unemployment for Austria. Similar in spirit to the results of our paper, the latter show a much larger spike at exhaustion of the benefit entitlement period for all exits from registered unemployment compared to the exits to employment.
Our results show that the distribution of unemployment durations for the group of unemployed with successful exit to employment before and after the reform was evidently not affected by the reform considered here. Our results also suggest that the varying macroeconomic environment may affect the job search behavior for the considered age groups in a different manner. Finally, extended benefit entitlements for older unemployed are not found to increase the job match quality in terms of employment stability or earnings. Put differently, this suggests that, among the older unemployed, the selection of those unemployed who found a new job did not change in response to the reform. More research using a more structural approach at the cost of stronger identifying assumptions will be useful to assess further the robustness of our findings. 1985 1990 1994 1985 1990 1994 1985 1990 1994 1985 1990 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
